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ABSTRACT
This paper is intended to accomplish two tasks. First, exchange-rate
models of the sticky-price and flexible-price varieties respectively are
checked for their consistency with two key empirical regularities: (1) the
observed pattern of price-level vs. exchange-rate volatility, and (2) the
observed pattern of spot exchange-rate vs. forward exchange-rate volatility.
Second, a widely neglected reason for exchange-rate volatility, activist
monetary policy is studied.
It is found that both sticky-price and flexible price models explain
the empirical regularities rather well. Further, if prices are sticky it
is found that exchange-rate overshooting may be empirically non-trivial.
Robert P. Flood




The wi.desprea.d floating of exchange r'ates since 1973 has provided
the first ·.vorld-vlide data for studying flexible-rate regimes in the post-
WJII era. The larg.e volatility of exch.:::.nge. rates seen in these data
created a natural scientific demand {or .:In exchange-rate theory consistent
with the ne"l evidence. The beginnings of such a t.heory, which became
known as the Asset Market Approach to Exchange Rates, emerged in 1976 in
the \·wrk of Dornbusch (1976), Frenkel (1.976)~, Kouri (1976), and Mussa
(1976~. In particular, these authors offered explanations for why
exchange rates may be expected to be more volatile than current underlying
exchange-market fundamentals):/
Dornbusch (1976): suggested that goods markets adjust slowly while
asset markets (to a first approximation) adjust immediately. Since exchange
rates are asset prices they adjust quickly compared with goods prices.
With both goods prices and exchange rates entering asset markets, exchange
rates must bear a larger immediate burden of asset market adjustment,
following a disturbance, than will be required once goods prices have begun
to adjust. This was the celebrated overshooting result which has subsequently
been refined by Frankel (1979)1 Frenkel and Rodriguez (1980») Mussa
(1977)~'. Rogoff (1979) and Wilson (1979).'
The explanation offered by Frem:el (1976) , andMussa (1976a) was
that since current exchange rates reflect agent~ beliefs not simply about
current market fundamentals but also about the entire future of such
fundamentals, a disturbance to current fundamentals may be magnified in
its exchange-rate impact because of the disturbance's effect on beliefs-2-
about future fundamentals. This explanation was call~d the magnification
effect and has been studied by Bilson (1978), (1979) and Meese and
Singleton (1980a).
The explanation offered by Kouri (1976) was that a disturbance to
current fundamentals may be magnified through its. affect on the current and
expected future distribution of world wealth. This explanation has been
studied in linear models with rational expectations by Boyer and Hodrick
(1980) and Flood (1979b).
It is useful to think of the Kouri view as one which endogenizes
explicitly one of the elements of market fundamentals of the Frenkel-Mussa
model. This is an interpretation pursued in the appendix. Because of
the relative analytical difficulty of Kouri's model, magnification effects
are discussed here only for the Frenkel-Mussa model.
The present paper is intended to accomplish two tasks. First, models
predicting overshooting and magnification respectively will be checked fo~
their consistency with two key empirical regularities:
(1) the observed pattern of price-level vs. exchange-rate volatility,
(ii) the observed pattern of spot exchange-rate vs. forward exchange-
rate volatility.
Second, a widely neglected reason for exchange-rate volatility, activist
monetary policy, will be studied.'.' ':"'.' ,~_.
-3-
Accomplishing the first task requires that we note that two important
differences between the Dornbusch and the Frenkel-Mussa models are that
Dornbusch's has sticky goods prices while Frenkel's and Mussa's have freely
flexible prices, .and Dornbusch distinguishes between domestic goods and
other goods while Frenkel and Mussa deal only with a single aggregate
commodity. In order to confront the pattern of exchange rates and price
levels the Frenkel-Mussa model is expanded presently to distinguish
domestic and other goods. In the context of this expanded model it is
found that both the Dornbusch and the Frenkel-Bussa models are consistent
with observed data when the domestic share of the domestic good in con-
sumption is greater than the foreign share of the domestic good in their
consumption, and both models are inconsistent \dth the data when the above
condition on consumption shares does not hold.
The second empirical regularity, which is that the spot exchange rate
and forward exchange rates (of all maturities) tend to move closely together
. and thus have about the same degree of volatility is a striking fact which
is uot necessarily implied by either version of the mode2..~ :;£~:.iY.J... the
differences in spot and 90 day forward rate volatility are explored for
five industrial countries and the results are interpreted in terms of
both the Dornbusch and Frenkel-Mussa versions of the model. In addition
I examine the pattern of spot and forward rate vol~tility for the U.S.-
Canada rates for a forward maturity of 360 days.
The results here are suggestive of a methodology which may be useful in
measuring the importance of exchange-rate overshooting.
The paper's second task is to argue that activist monetary policy
contributes to exchange-rate volatility. In an example it is shown that
if monetary policy is actually attempting to stabilize interest rates
and if a monetary innovation is treated as uncorrexated with other
disturbances in the economy then by ignoring the covariance of monetary
innovations wit:.l other disturbances, exchange-rate volatility will be
consistently under-predicted.-4-
TIle organization of the paper is as follows." In section II the two
versions of the model are presented and solved. In section III both versions
of the model are called on to explain the observed pattern of prices and
exchange rates. In section IV both versions are challenged to explain
simultaneously spot-rate volatility in excess of volatility in fundamentals
and forward-rate volatility which is approximately the same as spot-rate
volatility. Section V contains the argument that activist monetary policy
exacerbates exchange-rate volatility.
II. Two Versions of a Two Commodity Exchange-Rate Model
The model presented in this section describes a country which is
large oRly in the markets for its own money and its own output. Both a
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money supply (mt ) minus the price level (rrt ) equals real money demand, where
money demand depends on the level of the domestic interest rate (it) and
the logarithm of real domestic income (Pt + Yt - ~t)' with Pt and Yt the
logarithms of the domestic pric~ of domestic eutput and the quantity of
domestic output, respectively. To simplify algebra I assume ~2 = 1, which
implies that (1) may be written as
i + 2/ mt - p t = ~O - ~l t yt·- (14)
Equation (2) defines the price index (~t) with e being the domestic
consumption share of the domestic good and qt being the logarithm of the-6-
domestic price of the forei~l good. Equation (3) s~ates the covered
interest parity condition with it the level of the foreign interest rate,
f t the one period forward exchange rate and St the spot exchange rate.
Equation (4) says that the forward rate equals the expected future
spot rate, tE being the conditional mathematical expectation operator
with information at time t conditioning the expectation. The ti,me t
information set, nt' is defined to include the values of all relevant
variables dated t or earlier and the values of the model's parameters. It
follows that tExt+j =E(Xt+j lOt) for any variable h t+j •
Recent empirical work on equation (4) has produced a mixed set at·;.:
results, with the weight of the evidence suggesting that (4) does not hold
3/ exactly,- In particular there may be a time-varying risk premium separating
f t and tESt+l (see Meese and Singleton (1980b).~/ However, such e~idence
does not contradict the assertion that (4) is a good approximation and a
useful simplification in a study of exchange""Ta-ce voicn::1.b.:l.:'y.
Equation (5) states that yt is a constant (y), which is normalized
to zero.
domestic
Equation (6) gives the logarithm of aggregate demand for ~he
d good (Y~). This demand depends on the logarithm of the relative
price of the domestic good (Pt qt)' the domestic real rate of interest
(it - tE(~t+l - ~t»' and ~ a term summarizing aspects of foreign or
domestic demand not eaptured elsewhere~/Equations ("1> and (8) ensure that
goods markets are arbitraged as pi is the foreign price of the domestic
good and q1 the foreign price of the foreign good.
Goods market equilibrium is described by (9a) or (9b) depending on
whether prices are sticky or flexible. If prices are sticky, equation (9a)
is the relevant goods market equilibrium condition. Conditional on t - 1-7-
information the price of domestic output for time t, Pt' is set at the
level expected to clear the goods market during period t. Such pricing is
purely anticipatory of events expected at t, but Pt does not respond to
actual events at t and thus is predetermined. This type of pricing is
a polar extreme of standard pricing rules. Mussa (1976b) and McCallum
(1980): derive rules where pricing is partly anticipatory and partly
dependent on past excess demand.~/ In the Dornbusch model, pricing depends
entirely on past excess demand. Thus, the present pricing rule and that
of Dornbusch are extremes, which are spanned by the rules of MUssa and
McCallum. The extreme of purely anticipatory pricing has been adopted
presently because of its analytical simplicity. Where app~opriate,
the modifications of the argument required for other sticky price rules
will be indicated.
For flexible prices, equilibrium condition (9b) holds. Here~ Pt is
determined simultaneously wiLh other variables during period t. Equations
(10) - (12) specify mt , ii and ~ to be first order autoregressive processes.
For simplicity ii and W1 ate treated as random walks~ Equation (13) states
that the foreign-currency price of foreign goods (q!) is a constant (q*),
which is normalized to zero. The variables vt ' ~ and ui are zero mean
disturbance terms which are mutUally and serially uncorrelated with finite
• 2 2... d 2* . 1 7 / var1ances a , a ~ an cr respective y.- v v u
Solutions







where the y.. and A.. are expressed in terms of behavioral parameters in
~J ~J
table I.
The sticky price solutions in table I were obtained from equations
(2)-(8), (14), price setting in accord with (9a) and exogenous processes
(lO)-(13)~ The solutions for the flexible price version also use (2)-(8),
(14), and (10)-(13) but uses (9b) instead of (9a).
Note that the results of the sticky price version are similar to those
of Dornbusch (1976), and Mussa (1977). If money follows a random walk
(p = 1) then Y1l = 1, implying the effect of a monetary disturbance on
the exchange rate (Y12) must be greater than the disturbance itself,
1 Y12 =-- + 1 > 1. A similar result holds for v*, the disturbance to i*t.
~ . t·
Market fundamentals are defined presently to be the set of state variables
L = (mt - l , vt ' i~_l' v~, ~-l' u~) which are the same for both versions
of the model.~/TABLE I
YIO Yn Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 'Y16
*
P L+ P a1 + (B2/B1) 1 + a1 + (82/61) -lIB -l/f\ I + al (l - p) a1 1 + a1 - P 1
--
Sticky Prices Y20 Y21 Y22 Y23 Y24 Y25 Y26
*
P 0 a1 0 0 0 1 + a1(1 - p)
A 10 . All A 12 A 13 A 14 . A 15-I A 16
P 1 + a1A 11
* al + (B/81) a1 + (B/81) -1/8 -lIS 1 + a,(l - p) 1 + a1 1 1 ...






1 + al A 11 0 0
' .. " ai a1
\
I + al (l - jJ) I + al
- * Constant terms not reported
.'.' ... ~-10-
Volatility
In the following sections the volatility of any variable xt is defined
by
(19)
~here t_1EXt =E(xt Int-I) and nt-1 is the t - 1 information set which
includes all variables dated t - 1 and earlier and the structure of the model.
The present measure of volatility is a measur~ of predictability, which
Frenkel and Mussa (1980, pp 374-5) argue to bejPP1;Opriate for
'J
exchange rates~/
III. Exchange Rates and Prices
Recent empirical work has found that exchange rates and national
price levels (consumer prices or wholesale prices) do not follow closely
~e predictions of purchasing power parity. The relationship of prices and
exchange rates was studied by at the macro-level by Frenkel (1980a), (1980b)
and Krugman (1978) , and was examined at a more micro-level by K4avis and
Lipsey (1978). Isard (1977) and Magee (1978).. These studies suggest
that except for the most homoge~ous of products, different countries' outputs
.hould be treated as different products. This regularity has been
embedded in the two versions of the model at hand" by differentiating domestic
and foreign goods.
Another regularity concerning prices and exchange rates is that
exchange rates are more volatile than relative national price levels
(C.P.I. or W.P.I.). This point was made by Stockman (1980), Frenkel (1980a)
and Frenkel and Mussa (1980)>> and is docuncntcd f~r the current definition-11-
of volatility in Table II. The results in Table II indicate that the
ratio of spot rate volatility, lVAR(s), to relative C.P.I. volatilitv , t- . t J
t_lVAR(ln[C.p.r.(i)/C.P.r.(j)]), range from a low of 5.76 (i = Japan,
j = Switzerland) to a high of 110.18 (i ~ U.S., j = Switzerland). Thus,
we require our exchange rate tnodels to be consistent "'\lith exchange-rate
volatility substantially in excess of relative price level volatility.10/-12-
TABLE II
CANADA GERMANY JAPAN SHIJZERLAND U.K.
U.S. 16.60 54.76 15.58 1.10.18 9.4
CANJl.DA 43.39 15.21 53.30 7.01
GERMANY 11. 17 18.54 20.19
JAPAN 5.76 13.61
SWITZERLAND 14.59
The entries in this table give the ratio of the sum of squared residuals in regression
Sij to the sum of squared residuals in regression Pij where:
i, j are counters over the country set (U.S., Canada, Germany, Japan, Switzerland,
U.K.),
S.. is an ordinary least squares regression of the log of the mid-month spot
lJ
exchange rate for month t for countries i and j on a linear trend and the
,information set n(ij; t - 1) which is tbP.,..v..ect!'\r
n(ij; t - 1) ={s(ij; t - k), k =1, 2,3,4;
f(ij; t - k), k = 1, 2~ 3, (; p(i; t·· k), k = 1,2,3, l.!.;
p(j; t - k), k =1,2,3, 4},
where
s(ij; t - k) is th~ log of the mid-ncnth spot exchan~e rate for countries i
and j for month t - k
f(ij~ t - k) is the log of the mid-month 90 day forward exchange rate for
countries i andj for month t - k-13-
$.. is defined in Table I
lJ
P.. is the ordinary least squares regression of p(i, t) - p(j, t) on a linear
lJ
trend and the information set st(i, j, t - 1), ~'Jhich information set is defined.
in Table 1.
Data sources are reported in the appendix.
It is interesting to ask how well the two versions of the present model do in
explaining exchange-rate volatility in excess of price-level volatility. The domestic
price level is defined by equation (2) the foreign price level is given by-14-
TTi =~*p~ + (1 - 9*) q~, 0::; e~'~::; 1 (20)
" where ~k is the share of the domestic good in
J:: • consumption. Equations .L.ore~gn
(2), (20) , (7) and (8) may be manipulated to yield
TTt - 'f'l'·k = St + (8 - e-~)(p - St -qp. (21) t t
For the sticky price version, Pt is predetermined and for both versions
~ = q* = O. It follows that for sticky prices,
Thus, if e > ~ (i.e. if home goods are a larger share of home consumption
than of foreign consumption) (1 +~ - e) is a fraction and the sticky price
model has no difficulty in reconciling exchange-rate volatility in excess
of price-level volatility.
We next turn to the performance of the flexible price version. Equation




where t_lCov(xt , Zt) =t_lE[(xt - t_1Ext)(Zt - t_lEZt)] for any two variables
xt ' Zte To obtain an expression for price-level volatility with flexible











If e> 9* then both WI and W 2 are positive and the flexible~priceversion
predicts exchange-rate volatility in excesS of price-level volatility.
The intuition behind this result is that disturbances which alter relative
price (u~ and vt) tend to improve relative price (increasing Pt - St) when
appreci~ting the domestic currency (decreasing St) thus inducing a negaL~~~
covariance of St in (21) with the relative price term in (21). If (e -9*) > 0
then this negative covariance unambiguously produces exchange-rate volatility
in excess of price-level volatility.
-- - -- _ ......- ...-..__ ..-..._...__ ..
Three points are demonstrated in the analysis of this section. First,
I - both the sticky-price and flexible-price versions of the model predict
exchange-rate volatility in excess of price-level- volatility when the share
',"~~16-
of domestic goods in domestic consumption is greater than the share of
domestic goods in foreign consumption. Second, deviations from purchasing
power parity, which may be obst~ined from equation (21), show persistence
if relative price changes show persistence whether prices are sticky or
flexible. For example, for flexible prices and the exogenous processes
presented here Pt - St (the terms of trade) fpllows a random walk implying
(for e 'f: 15k') that TTt - TT~ - St also follows a random walk. Third, both
versions predict a negative correlation of innovations in St and innovations
in the te~s of trade (p
t
- St). For the sticky price version, the correlation
arises because exchange-rate innovations ~ innovations in the terms of
trade. In the flexible-price version the correlation arises because things
which tend to improve the te~s of trade (positive ut negative ~) tend to
i h d · 11/ apprec: ate t e omest~c currency.-
IV. Ezchange Rate Volatility in the Spot ;It:.d Forward Zxchan~,,:.!::a~kets
Studying the time series behavior of spot exchange rates Meese and
Singleton (1980) ~ found that they could not reject the hypothesis that
exchange r.ates follow a random walk around a linear trend. This hypothesis
is formalized as
~en (27) and (28) are combined with the additional assumption
(27)
(28)
i • 0, 1, 2 •••, (29)-17-
the following may be deduced
!.:..!Var(tEst+j)
l' j :;: 0, 1. 2, (30) Var(E; ) , . .
t-l t
Equation (30) states that the volatility of any expected future spot rate
and the current spot rate are approximately equal.
To the extent that forward rates are equal to expected future spot
rates, equation (24) matches closely the regularity noted by Mussa (1979,
page 14) that flFor all maturities of forward contracts, the day-to-day (or
week-to-week or month-to-month) change in the forward rate. is always
very close to the day-to-day (or week-to-week or ffionth-to-mon~h) change
in the contemporaneous spot rate." Mussa's observation and equation (24)
match the regularity reported in Table III, which provides measures of
t-lVar(ft+3) /t-lvar(st).12/ .In the rest of this section '~~1~"'~fi:ion6
of the model will be called on to explain the regularity reported in
Table III. First, expressions for both sticky prices and f~exible p't'ices
will be developed for t_1Var(St+j)/t_1Var(St)' Second for hypothetical
(but perhaps reasonable) values of the relevant behavioral parameters
the values of these expressi9ns will be compared with the values in Table III.-18-
lABLE II I
CANADA GERMANY JAPAN· SW ITZERLAND U.K. . . -
U.S. 1.05 .99 1;.07 -1 .. 01 1.22
CANADA 1..05 1.. 07 -1 .. ~~ 1.15
GERMANY ::' 1.07 .. 9~ 1.1 Q
JAPAN .- ::' J.·93 1.07
SWITZERLAND ~ ~ ::- 1.13
The entries in this table give the ratio of the ~um of squared resi(jua1s in regression
S.. to the sum of squared residuals in regression F.., where: 1J .-. . -..,J .
Sij is a regression defined in lapl~ ~J ~nd FiJ
i~ ~n 9rginary l~~~t ?q~ares
regression of the log of th~ mid~month ~O gay (3 month) forwar(j ex~ang~ rate
for month t for countries i and j on a linear trend and the information
> • ....... ...... .. ,,' - '.' - ~ _..... _... - - .,.'. '-
set n(ij; t - 1), which is defined in =r?~l~ n~ P?ta ?9!:lr~~§ar~ r?P9rt~9
1n the Appendix.-19-
The Sticky-Price Version
Equation (14) may be rewritten as
( 31)
where ~t ~ lJlt + ~lit ~ Yt~ for the stic~y price vexsiQn, Pt is pr~detepmined
and hence disturbances which are felt through ~ (such as curxent mon~tar.y
. t
di ..st:\.lrbl.:lUces) must une:ll:pectedJ.y alter the fon17ard' premium, Es +1 .. S • t t . t'
'Unexpected changes in tEst+l- St obviously require different l,lUexpected
chpuge§ in tEst+l and St and thus different volatility.
Th~ §tic~y-pXice version of the model illustxates an example of this
p9int~ :for the sticky..price version use (15) to calculate
-Up ~~ ~;]I:.p.e·cted :f,UWJ."oe §p9t l',~te (j ;;;: 1) ~ F&1J."th-e:r ~ if fJ i§ in the ra.n~
• 1 S ~ S 1 the1J. the §~t rSit~ i§ ~e ·vplgtt:i1.e th.an a.ll ~J:C:p~t~ f1.:lt.1:1re
§pot: r~U§, ~ if \ fJ I~ 1 tt..efJ. ff)r _j~~!lU1' than §,~ i~u~el', S!:J:Cpeet..e(1
MJ ~ulMt.n.8e r.ste j.§ §~id t() ~e1'§h.()f)t when it§ ifijlIIediate respon.se t.o
.. 4:ii-§f;~:~'t)~e i:$ :tar$er th.an .S~ f)~h.nM:1:t.k j:S!:sp!mse (~(1919:b) .. FoOl:
.. §t:1~l.t-.Y-.P'~i..ee w.~el t:~ .Slppr~vri.at~ ben-.ehw..aik i:l> the e-.ub.a-n~~.SlU"§
~dut..~ re.s.ponse .eo.nditiona.1.fXl -p1::iees 'bewgf~eel1 fl-e-x:i.ble.. :ftlrt:her,
st-U:ky ~jge :l;\\9deb §h~J:re th~~§pe.ct :that tM tp:.rw~1.".d prero-i-JJ:m mU:l>t ~j-y.§t
to .acePID.o,d.ate ~H.s:tu-,:'b~t1ces t-o~·u:r1."ent mo-n~y-ms',l:.·ke.t f.Ui'ldamentals..
,-20-
l~e model at hand is special in that with purely anticipatory pricing,
the goods market is currently expected to be in equilibrium next period
and to remain in equilibrium indefinitely. Thus, the economy is expected
to attain its long-run or benchmark path after a single period's adjustment.
This differs from sticky-price models with adjustments to lagged disequilibrium
because in such model~ the economy approaches the long-run path assymtotically.
However, if the present model exhibited typical price adjustment to past
disequilibrium then it would converge to the same path achieved in one
period by the present sticky-price version.
Consider the nature of the difference in response patterns of current
and expected future spot rates for purely anticipatory pricing vs. lagged
disequilibrium pricing when the disturbance is believed to be a once-and-
for all increase in the money supply (p = 1). With Pt predetermined, the
fi~st period money-market response is the same for both pricing rules--the
forward premium adjusts to clear the money market. Thus, the exact same
wedge must be driven between the current and the one period expected future
spot rate irrespective of the pricing rule. However, with purely anticipatory
pricing the induced change in the forward premium is the exact measure of
overshooting as complete adjustment is expected to be made in one period.
With pricing in response to lagged disequilibrium, pri~e i~ B£! expected
to adjust fully by next period and thus real balances are expected to be
higher next period with lagged adjustment pricing than with purely
anticipatory pricing. These additional real money balances require higher
money demand, which is accomplished by a second period rational forward-21-
discount on foreign currency (i.e. tEst+2 < tES~l). Since this discount
is rational, the spot rate must be expected to continue falling during
tile second period. Indeed; the argument maybe extended to show that the
spot rate must be expected to continue falling in all future periods until
goods market equilibrium is attained.
The first period premium (tEst+l - St) is the sante for both rules
and both rules have the same long run, but the lagged disequilibrium rule
requires anticipated adjustments in st+j for j >'1. Hence the lagged
disequilibrium rule must provide a larger immediate exchange-rate response
than the purely anticipatory rule. l~is larger response is entirely in
terms of greater overshooting.
Since the long-run response is the same for both pricing rules
but the immediate response is larger for lagged disequilibrium pricing
than for purely anticipatory pricing, it follows that (for the disturbance
considered) for maturities greater than some length the difference in spot
and forward-rate volatility must be greater under lagged disequilibrium
pricing than under purely anticipatory pricing.
This result is exactly correct for p = 1 and it will hold up for
- 1 S pSI. When Ipi> 1, then, irrespective of the pricing rule, for
maturities of forward contract greater than some length forward rates
would be predicted to be more volatile than spot rates.
The example presented here gave current money market .disturbances a
central role. It may be though that money market disturbances do not enter
the money market currently and/or that disturbances to other markets are
important for exchange rate determination. First suppose that new information.-22-
involves future values of money market fundamentals rather than current
values. If such in.formation is the s.ource of money market disturbances
then equation (la') indicates that since innovations in future market
fundamentals do not enter (la') through ~t or Pt then the innovations
must have exactly equal effects on St and tEst+l as would be true with
St following a random walk. Second, suppose that disturbances to goods
markets are an important source of exchange-rate volatility. (This would
2 2 be true presently if YlS(JuoJf were large relative to other components of
equation (32).) If these goods market disturbances are uncor~elated with
money market disturbances then St and tEst+l must be affected equally by
such disturbances as would be true if St followed a random-walk.
These last examples are not intended to suggest that exchange rates
actually must follow a random walk in response to the discussed disturbances.
They are only intended to point out that substantial co-mqvement of Bt and
tEst+l is not ruled out by the sticky-price version.
The Flexible-Price Version
To begin studying the flexible-price version it is useful to rewrite
(14) as
= - (34)
since ~t contains the nominal variable rot it is reasonable to suppose that
disturbances to ~t may, in part, be signals of disturbances to money growth
rates. If such disturbances do signal. changes in money growth rates then-23-
these disturbances will alter both sand (Es 1 - s). To the extent that
---- t t t+ t
~
a disturbance in ~t results in an unexpected increase in (tES~~l - St) then
the disturbance's effect on St will be ~a~nified in its effect on St. Indeed,
this is precisely the magnification effect of Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976)••
For a magnification effect to take place though, tEst+lmust be more volatile
than St. This point is illustrated in the following example.
For the flexible-price version,use equation (17) to calculate.
(35)
j = 1, 2, 3, ...(36)
By inspecting the values of Al2 and All listed in Table I we find
that the expressions in (35) and (36) are exactly the same only when g = 1.
If - 1 < p < 1 then (36) must be less than (35) for all j and if Ipi> 1
then (36) must be greater than (35) for all j.
The case ofl~1 > 1 is relevant as this is required for the magnification
effect to be present. In this model, the magnification effect holds for
monetary disturbances when A12 > 1. The magnification effect is the flexible
price counterpart to overshooting in that it too explains spot-rate volatility
. in excess of volatility in curr.ent market fundamentals.
Some Illustrative Calculations
The point of the present discussion is to relate the above formal
models to the data. To establish such a relation (without estimating the
model) assumptions need to be made about some of the model's parameters.-24-
In particular values of Ctl and p will be sufficient to gain some
preliminary insights about the importance of magnification and ov~rshooting
effects.
In his widely cited study Goldfe1d (1973) found that the combined
13/ long run interest elasticity of money demand was -,23 ..-·- ro convert
h " b " 1 "" 14/ d'"d" b 1 " t 1S num er to a seml-e astlclty-- we 1V1 e It y toe appropr1ate
interest rate which I assume to be .08 (8 percent per year). Thus the
annual semi-elasticity is 2.875 years. Presently 1 month is taken to pe
the relevant period and the monthly semi-elasticity is thus (2.875 yea~s)
x (12 months/year) = 34.5 months. which is the v~tue of a~ Y$ed below.
To have a magnification effect present we nee~ p > 1. fY~the~~ $YGh
a nonstationary money supply process is consi~t~~t with the model only
if Ipi < (a1 + l)/al ~ 1.03.15/ The choice of P in ~he rgn~e 1. < p < 1.03
is arbitrary. The following calculations use p : 1,015.
For the flexible price version we find
t_1Var(tESt+3)
=1 + { 1 .} < 1-.093
t_lVar(St) A14cr~* + 1-16 0-3*




=1 + { 1 } .-::: 1,43~
t:-lVar(st) A14crt* + 1-16cr3*




Since Table III \.;ras constructed using 90 day forward rates and the
Gal~ulation for lVar(s 3)/ ]Var(s ) used one month as the relevant t,.... t+ (- _ t
p~riod they ar~ of comparable dimensions. Further, the relative volatility
9f ~~St+J and St from our illustrative calculation matches quite closely
the estimated relative volatities of the 90 day forward rates and spot
~?tes as r~ported in Table riI.
1'9 9ptain some i..dea of the importance of exchange rate overshooting
it is ~§eful to h~ve a measure of the relative volatities of spot rates
~n4 long~r t~r~ forward rates. Presently, I have obtained this measur~
only for V.S. ~ C&nad~ spot and 360 day forward rates. The measure is
_16/
t~lVgr(ft+lf)/t~lVgr(st)~ 1.L7--··.
To y~~ this ~~gsur~ to gg!n gn idea of the extent of overshooting
Wh~f~ ~ bar ~V~f a vgfigbl~ ind1cgt~s that it is interpreted as being
(39)
e~nditiQngl Qn th~ ~t!~ky=priGe v~rsion and the absence of a bar indicates
~het th~ Vgfie~le i~ to b~ int~fPf~ted as conditional on the flexible-price
v~f§iQn, Thy~. if th~ WQfld i~ eetu&lly a sticky-price world, ~ measures
th~ h~~tiQn pf gXGhgn~~ fate v91at;i.lity due to exchange-rate overshooting.
(40)-26-
and by manipulating (40) and using (39),
lVar(f 12) - lVar(s) t- t+ t- t
t_lVar(st)
- ].l .17. (41)
This may be further manipulated to obtain
].l = .17 (42)
Since we are assuming f t+12 = tEst+lZ previous calculations (equation (38»
t_lVar(ft+lZ) - t_lVar(st)
yield V ( ) ~ .435. Further, it seems reasonable
t-l ar St
to assume that the vast bulk of all slow goods market adjustment is expected
to be completed by a one year horizon implying f t+12 ~ f t+lZ and
t_lVar{ft+lZ) - t_lVar(ft+lZ) ~ 0.
17
/ Using these additional assumptions
we find ~ ~ .185, which says as much as 18.5% of U.S. - Canadian exchange-
rate volatility may be due to exchange-rate overshooting.
It must be emphasized that the calculations in this section are
intended only as a rough comparison of the models and the data. A more
elaborate study would estimate the relevant behavioral parameters and
parameters of the exogenous processes. However, this preliminary examination
indicates that both versions of the model are roughly consistent ~ith
the data and that exchange-rate overshooting may be phenomenon of non-triv~al
magnitude.-27-
v. Monetary Policy and Exchange-Rate Volatility
The modeling of previous sections presumed money to be exogenously
generated by the simple autoregressive scheme of equation (10). This pre-
sumption is naive. In fact, monetary policy is dominated largely by policy-
makers' desires to control variables other than the money supply. Such
policy is said to be activist policy, which is formalized presently by a
linear money supply rule linking money supply movements to movements in ~noth2r
variable in the model. In this section activist monetary policy will
replace the simple autoregression of previous sections.
The point to be made in this section is that if monetary policy is
activist, in a realistic way, and if observers try to interpret exchange-rate
volatility conditional on non-activist policy (e.g. the autoregression of
past sections) then there is a natural tendency for observers to underpredict
the extent of exchange-rate volati~ity: Such an underprediction, of course,
gives the appearance of exchange-rate volatility in excess of volatility
in market fundamentals.
Because the point to be made here is a point about monetary policy
and not about the market for home goods a special case of the flexible-price
version of the model will be adopted. To generate this special case let
61
~ = in equation (6). The goods and money markets thus collapse to
(43)
We continue to assume i* = i* + v* b . t t-l t ut now ~mpose
(44)-28-
where lA~ =·x E· th . t- ~t t - t-l xt ~s e ~nnovation operator and ~~ and v are
t t
mutually and serially uncorrelated disturbances having zero means and finite
• 2.. d 2
var~ances, av~ an crv respectively.
Notice that we can write (44) as
(45)
(46)
and since vt is orthogonal to all variables dated t - 1 or earlier, a
researcher investigating the time series behavior of money, conditional on
exogenity, would not discover the true nature of vt and would interpret v
t
as a monetary innovation uncorrelated with the model's other disturbances.
The example at hand has been cooked-up to provide ease of computations.
Note that expected money growth, tE(mt+l - mt ) is the constant m. With
rational expectations, this ~plies that tE(st+l - St) is also a constant.






An investigator believing vt to be a monetary disturbance uncorre:lated
with ~ would predict-29-
with the model requiring,
...
t"'lVar(vt ) (51)
Thus, the naive prediction of exchange-rate volatility is
'"
However, vt: j.~ a<:t1,.1dl.y correlated with ~ and hence, properly computed (49)
yj.el-dB
'fb~ J'dativ~ diHerence of (52) and (53) is
(54)
When p~liey maker§ Bttem~t to §tabilige interest rates they make 0l_Positive,
lmptyil\~ that 06) mU$t be positive. The size of (54) depends on the size
of ~~* fel@tiv~ to~; ~nd on the ~elationship of 51 to ~l. In the most
@Kt~emg e~~e, ~;!c~* ~ 0 ~nd 61 • ~l implying that the naive prediction
mh.§e~ 50% of the v4dability of exchange rates.
Tho above eK~ple i~ ~imple but its point, which is that price
variability depend~ on e13~tieities of excess demand and the variability
of underlying ~xpgenou~ di~turbances, is robust to a range of alternative
.•peeifie~tion~. Firpt eon$ider the response of the sticky price version
toa forei~l intere~t rate disturbance. If (44) now governs the money-30-
supply then the interest rate disturbance brings_abonc a monetary innovation
which alters excess demand for rooney in the same direction as the interest
rate disturbance alters the excess demand. This exces's demand is balanced
and partially offset by overshooting which induces a change in the forward
premium. The extent of overshooting however is exacerbated by the covariation
of monetary and foreign interest rate innovations.
Second, suppose that money growth responds negatively to output
innovations. If so, then an output innovation will raise money demand and
reduce money supply requiring a larger exchange rate innovation to clear
the money market than would be needed if monetary growth were exogenous
to output disturbances. Third, in the above it has been assumed that money
growth responds only to innovations in endogenous variables. Since the
levels of those endogenous variables must contain their innovations the
argument would not be much altered if (44) were to depend on the level of
it relative to a target.
VI. Some Policy Inplications
The present analysis illustrates two well known policy implications
of the asset market approach to the foreign exchange market (see e.g.
Frenkel and Mussa (1980». First, nonstationary growth of money (relative
to income) produces magnification of the exchange-rate effects 6f monetary
disturbances and thus produces high volatility of exchange rates relative
to the volatility of monetary disturbances. Thus; policy makers desiring
to reduce exchange-rate volatility .might well look toward stabilizing
the money supply process.-31--
Second, exchange rates are only a portion of the set of macro-
variables which concern policy makers, who opero.te using a limited set
of tools. Concentration of policy on stabi.lizing variables other than
exchange rates can render exchange rates more volatile than they otherwise
would have been. Thus, policy making with many "targets" but limited
"tools" requires coherent policy not a piece meal of "exchange rate
policy" and (for example) "interest rate policy."
VII. Concluding Remarks
Four main points emerge in this paper:
(i) The failure of purchasing power parity is ~ phenome~on having featu~e~
reconcilable with either stfcky-pri~~ or fl~xible-pric~model$. The
feature examined in detail presently, vol~~ilityof e~ch~n~e ~ate~
in excess of volatility in national price level~. ~~qui~ed identica.l
conditioning of the sticky-pric~ and tle~ible.p~ice ve~sipn~.
(ii) The fact that spot exchange rates ~nd eontemppraneo1,.lS ferward ~a.te~
for maturities of up to one year tr§.~~ ea~h othe~ §>Q well i{il 8.
striking regularity, which is not neGes§arily p.redic.ted by popu18~
models of the foreign exchange ma.rket. It wa$ ~e~n that while
spot and forward rates may move ~losely t6gethe~ thei~ volatility
is quite different with forward ra.tes being more v91~tile tha.n
spot rates. Once we allow a nonsta.tionary money ~uppl~ the flexible
price -version predicts more volatility in f~~a.rd rate$ than in .pot
rates. Further, the sticky pric~ version 1~ al§o con~i~tent with
this regularity for forward maty~iti~~ 19n9~~ than one month.-32-
(iii) At the outset of the Asset Harket Approach to exchange rates Mussa
(1976) pointed out the sufficiency of ~reating the money supply as
"an arbitrarily prescribed stochastic process, a stochastic black
box'~/ when modeling agents' beliefs about the rate of change of the
exchange rate. While this point is correct for the first
moment of the exchange-rate distribution, it is not correct for
understanding higher moments of exchange-rate distributions, ego
volatility. The precise stochastic structure of the money supply
process can be ever:y bit as important as the structure of money
demand for understandir.g the volatility of exchange rates.
(iv) The explanations of exchange-rate volatility studied here naturally
compete for professional priority but they are in no way mutually
exclusive. Hence, it would be unsurprising to find all present,
in some measure, in a satisfactory explanation of exchange-rate
volatility.-33-
APPENDIX A
Comparj.ng the Kouri and the Frenkel-Nuss-a Models
The model in sec~ion V'may be written as
(AI)
where Zt is some val:'iabl~ affecting money demand. Manipulate (AI) to yield
.. ..I eo r
(zt+j
0.1 )j St = .* + .. mt+j)}(l + a. 1 +9.i E tE"cx.O ,. a.i ~t+j (A2) j;=O I
Suppose that v
t is ~ el,lfnmt mon~t.Clry disturbance then the magnification
effect requires
ds 1 d(zt+" • mt+ o ) 0., 0 --! =---==""';;"",! E{ _n_ - .1... _J,.1 ( . - _. )J > I
dVt 1 + 11.1_ o;:::ot· QV", 1. -+ "'I J - I- -
(A3)
In the example~ ~~n~1d~l:'ed by Nl,lsSa tEd~t+j/dvt ~ 0, j = 0, 1, _2 •••, and thus
these examples i~~lved magnification due ~~tirelY to money growth.
(A4)
with Zt having the i~te~~ret~tion of the logarithm of real marketable wealth
and k
t being fegl ~et fQfeisn asset$. .AIthough (A3) is invariant to the
definition of ~t :i.t h us~fl,ll. to use (A4) to ,.,.rite- (AI) as
(AS)
which may be mg~1pulated to yield=-34-
-1 o == ~l. (1 .. AJ
From (A6) it ;i.s apparent that the magnification effect requires
(A7)
(A7) does nqt differ ~rom (A3); it ~s (A3) written using the definition (A4) 0
The intere~ttng e~ampl.es which have u.sed the Kouri version have not imposed
dkt+j/dVt
~ 0, j ~ t, 2, "0' indeed the centerpiece of these studies is
the cur~~nt ~~~9U.~t which ~ov~rns the evolution of kt " Thus, the difference
between e~g1Jlp1.es ~sj.ng !;:he Frenkel.··~ussa and Kouri versions centers on
emphasi~ with the frenke1.~Mus~aversion ~on~entratingon the time path of
mt+j aM th~ K~Yf;i,. v~t'si9n ~9n~entral;;ing 9n the time path of kt+j - mt+j.
'1'b~ lite'fgtyre ~o):lt.~in~ pthe:r e~amples of the z variable where"
-35-
APPENDl)( B
The data used in this paper are derived from the Division of
International Finance Data Base, maintained by the Boal
1d of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. The Data Base provides daily spot exchange
rate time series expressed in u.S. cents per national currency unit. From
these _data, monthly spot rate time series, s(i,j), were constructed where
i,j are counters over the country set (U.S., Canada, Germany, Japan,
Switzerland, U.K.) and i represents the denominating currency. For i=U.S.,
this series consists of the log of the daily spot rate prevailing on the
nth trading day of every month of x total trading days where
n~x/2 for mont:ls ',Ii th an ever. nur.:bei~ of trad; n~ days
n~(x/2)+.5 for months with an odd number of trading days.
For irU.S. ,5(; ,j)=s(U.S. ,j)-s(u.S.,n.
The Data Base also provides daily 90 day forward exchange rate time
series expressed in premium values. These series were first converted to
level rates and then used to construct monthly series, f(i,j), as above.
The consumer price indices used in this paper, p(j), are monthly time
series taken directly from the Data Base:
United States CPI
Canada CPI, all items
Germany CPI, cost of living index
Japan--National CPI
Switzerland Consumer Price Index--total
United Kingdom Retail Price Index.
In all cases, the data are seasonally unadjusted.
For country sets where i or j=Germany,s(i,j), f(i,j), and p(j) extend
. from January, 1975 to November, 1979·inclusive. For all other sets, the time
series extend from October, 1974 to November. 1979 inclusive.-36-·
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FOOTNOTES
!/ Definitions of many terms used in the introduction (eg. volatility)
are contained in later sections.
~/ Equation (1) may be written as
The assumption a2 = 1 allows us to ignore (Pt - qt) in money demand. The
influence of (Pt - qt) is proportional to (a2 - 1) times the share of
foreign goods in domestic consumption, which is the product of two small
« .5) fractions. An equivalent simplification, followed by Dornbusch (1976),
is to deflate nominal money and nominal income by p rather than TI •
t t
1/ This empirical work is exemplified by Bilson (1980), Frenkel (1977),
Garber (1978), Hakkio (1980), Hansen and Hodrick (1979), and Meese and
Singleton (1980b).
~/ Wyplosz (1980) has modeled a time-varying risk premiums in a maximizing
model of an open economy.-43-
11 Instead of assuming domestic output to be constant it may be assumed
that output depends positively on relative price (see Flood and Marion (1980)
Appendix 5) in \vhich case 81, in (6) , would be interpreted as an ex~ess
demand elasticity.




Pt+j is the price which would clear the goods market at t =I- j.
A A "
<S = 1 and t-lEPt-l = p Mussa's rule is Pt = t-1EPt' T,1hich is the t-l
rule used in the present sticky-price version. Our pricing rule would
also result if output adjustment costs were zero in McCallum's (l980) ~od~l.
21 Flood (l979a) and Flood and Marion (1980a) have been critical of the
methodology of ignoring correlations among foreign variables. P~~sently
though, accounting for such correlations adds much complication without •
much illumination and thus they are ignored.
!/ Normally sticky-price models include at least one past price a.mQn.~
the set of state variables. The assumption of purely anticipato~y
pricing is attractive analytically because past price is irrelevant to
the current pricing decision.
9/ A conditional variance is used as the present measure of volatility
tO'accommodate a later discussion of a nonstationary money supply's
effect on the exchange rate. Nonstationary money causes a nonstationa~y
exchange rate and the unconditional variance does not exist for a non~t3tiona~y
series. Previous discussions involving exchange rate volatility (e.g••-44-
Bilson (1978), Mussa (1976 ), Dornbusch (1976)) have assumed nonstationary
money supply processes and thus if exchange rate variances were calculated
they would have had to be conditional variances.
10/ Since the C.P.I. is an average of prices sampled during the month
and the exchange rate is sampled at a point in time there is a natural
tendency for the exchange rate to be more volatile than a C.P.I. ratio.
As a crude correction for this problem I recomputed the u.S. - Canada
entry in Table II using a monthly average spot rate instead of a point in
time spot rate. The result was a volatility ratio of 8.5 rather than the
16.6 reported in Table II. Since the relative volatility of 8 continued
to match the regularity reported, this approach was discarded as being
redundant.
11/ Similar results are reported by Stockman (1980).
12/ The analysis of this section is based on the empirical regularities
summarized in Table III. It thus has a different basis than the variance
bounds work of Meese and Singleton (1980b) who derive upper bounds on
exchange rate variance using the error orthoganality property of optimal
forecasts. In the discussion that follows,one month will be taken as
the relevant period. Thus f t+3 refers to a forward exchange rate quoted
at time t for execution 3 months hence.
13/ Goldfeld found that the long run elasticity for' the interest rate
on time deposits was -.16 and that for the interest rate on commercial
paper was -.067. Thus the combined interest elasticity is -.227 ~ -.23
(Goldfeld, p. 602 Regression A).
... :too;,.,.,-45--
}i/ The present model assumes that money demand is semi-log linear, i.e.,
. the log of real money demand, rot - Pt' is linearly related to the level
of the interest rate, it. Since it has a time dimension (e.g. 10 percent
per year) the semi-elasticity must also have a time dimension (e.g. years)
so that their product (alit) is units free.
15/ Flood and Garber (1980 ) refer to this requirement as process
consistency.
16/ The number 1.17 is the ratio of the sum of squared residuals in
regression F12 to the sum of squared residuals in regression S, where F12
is an olsq regression of the 12 month (360 day) U.S.-Canada forward rate at
time t on a linear trend and the information set 6(t 1). S is an olsq
regression of the U.S. Canada spot rate at time t on a linear trend and
the information set 6 (t - 1). 6 (t - 1) is a vector of variables which
consists of
II(t - 1) = {s (t - i) ; i = 1, 2, 3, 4; ft +1(t - i) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4;
ft+3(t - i) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4· ft+12(t - i), i = 1, 2, 3, 4· , ,
p (t - i) , i = 1, 2, 3, 4· p* (t - i) , i = I, 2, 3, 4} , ,
where
s (t - i) = In U.S./Canada spot rate at t - i
~+1(t - i) = In U. S./Canada 30 day forward rate at t - i
:ft+3(t - i) = In U.S./Canada 90 day forward rate at t - i
\:+12(t - i) = In U.S./Canada 360 day forward rate at t - i
pet - i) = In Canadian C.P.I at t - i
p* (t - i) = In U. S. C.P.1. at t - i.
Data sources arc reported in the Appendix.-46-
12/ With purely anticipatory pricing and a time period of one month
f t+l2
= f t+l2• However, in general, adjustment might be expected to be
somewhat slower than the one period adjustment assumed for purely
anticipatory pricing. If aqjustment is slowe~ then f t+l2 would be more
volatile than f
t+l2 and by assuming equal volatility 'we understate the
extent of exchange rate overshooting. Since f t+j
+ f t+j as j becomes
large~ in most models, it is appropriate to use forward contracts of long
maturity to measure exchange-rate overshooting.
18/ See Mussa 1976a, pp 247.